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Lost feeling of ownership of one’s mental states: the importance 
of situating patient R.B.’s pathology in the context of 
contemporary theory and empiricism
Stanley B. Klein
Department of Psychological and Brain sciences, University of california, santa Barbara, ca, Usa
In her paper “Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity,” Rebecca Roache (this issue) makes a 
number of claims about the nature of memory, the nature of self, and the relation between the two. 
In particular, she argues that Klein and Nichols’s (2012) treatment of Locke’s connectivity account of 
self and memory rests on an “implausible,” “unsupported,” and “untenable” interpretation of patient 
R.B.’s memory problems.
I have no interest in debating Roache’s views on the relation between self and memory. Serious 
treatment of what currently is known about that relation easily would exceed the space provided for 
commentary. Suffice it to say that psychological discoveries over the past 60 years reveal that no sim-
ple account is capable of being fitted to Locke’s thesis: the relation, as now understood, consists in a 
complex interplay between different aspects of the self (for a review, see Klein, 2012; Klein & Gangi, 
2010) and different types of memory (e.g., Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; Tulving 1985). These 
issues are discussed in Klein (2014a).
 In what follows, I focus on Roache’s claim that patient R.B.’s report of losing possessory custody of 
mental content is not sanctioned by the language he uses to relate his phenomenology. I present evi-
dence (some new) supporting Klein and Nichols’s interpretation of patient R.B.’s ownership pathology 
and, in the process, argue that Roache’s re-analysis is unsupported by theory and evidence.
1. Ways of apprehending one’s intentional objects: first-person perspective versus 
personal ownership
Roache appears to subscribe to the idea that there are neural systems dedicated to the storage and 
retrieval of memories (allowing for modification following initial storage; e.g., Schacter, 1995). 
Accordingly, first-person experience of retrieved content is sufficient to designate that content as a 
memory.
 This view—that memory is retrieved into awareness “as memory” (the so-called “received view”)—
however, is called into question by recent findings suggesting that what is retrieved is not memory 
per se. Rather, it is system-agnostic content which can acquire the status of “memory” provided cer-
tain mental acts are performed after that content has been retrieved (for fuller discussion see Klein, 
2015; see also Dalla Barba, 2002; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2013; Moyal-Sharrock, 2009; Ranganath 
& Ritchet, 2012). For example, to experience retrieved content as an act of recollection (i.e., episodic 
memory), the content must be conjoined at retrieval with the pre-reflective feeling that it belongs to 
me (e.g., James, 1890; Klein, 2013, forthcoming; Tulving, 2005).
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 This confusion between episodic memory as given to consciousness and episodic memory as 
created by consciousness (via application of felt ownership to retrieved content) is reflected in Roache’s 
claim that the fact that R.B. 
can see the scene in my head. I’m studying with friends in the lounge at my residence hall. I am able to re-live 
it. I have a feeling … a sense of being at there, at MIT, in the lounge.
creates problems for any account of his pathology as a failure to maintain first-person perspective. 
I agree. But we did not claim R.B. lacked first-person perspective on his mental occurrences. In the 
remainder of the quote (which Roache does not present), R.B. comments: “But it doesn’t feel like I 
own it. It’s like I’m imagining, re-living the experience, but it was described by someone else.”
 Here, as in many places in the transcripts, R.B. is emphatic that although he experiences retrieved 
content (he describes it as “like watching a film”), he lacks any accompanying non-inferential feeling 
that he personally witnessed the events from which the content derived (“I didn't make it” [i.e., the 
film]). And, as previously noted, conscious apprehension of an intentional object (e.g., Brentano, 
1995), absent a feeling of ownership, renders an experience “memory-like” but not recollective. This, 
as we argued in Klein and Nichols (as well as many subsequent publications; e.g., Klein, 2013, 2014b, 
2015, forthcoming) is the crux of R.B.’s “memory” problem.
Klein and Nichols (2012) share some of the responsibility for what Roache sees as conceptual 
inconsistency. We were struggling to understand what, at the time, seemed a novel and bizarre neu-
ro-cognitive impairment (but see section 2). Accordingly, we took pains to present quotes (selected 
from more than 20 pages of transcripts) that we felt highlighted the nature R.B.’s pathology. However, 
our attempt to make sense of R.B.’s issues likely resulted in some expositional slippage.
2. Situating R.B.’s memory dysfunction in psychological theory
In subsequent papers (all cited by Roache; e.g., Klein, 2013, 2015, forthcoming), I more securely 
positioned R.B.’s problem within contemporary psychological accounts of memory (e.g., Dalla Barba, 
2002; Moulin, Souchay, & Morris 2013; Tulving, 1985; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). This enabled 
me to present a conceptually rigorous and theoretically grounded picture of R.B. as a person suffering 
a dissociation between first-person acquaintance with occurrent mental content and felt ownership 
of that content (in this way, he is like the schizophrenic who experiences a thought but feels that it 
was authored by someone else).
 R.B.’s reported experience is consistent with recent theory that memory is not just the content of 
one’s experience, but rather the manner in which that content is consciously apprehended (for fuller 
treatment see Dalla Barba, 2002; Klein, 2015; Tulving, 1985). The same (or substantially the same) 
content can be experienced as a belief, attitude, goal, thought, imagination, memory, and so forth. To 
qualify as recollection, content must be conjoined with a feeling that it belongs to me (e.g., Klein, 2013).
 On this view—which is found in many philosophical treatments of memory (e.g., Hume, Locke, 
Russell; for a review, see Klein, 2015)—first-person perspective is a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for having a memory experience. What also is required is that the content be experienced as 
mine (e.g., James, 1890; Klein, 2013; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2013). Convergent support is found in 
recent radiological and lesion studies showing that different neural systems appear to be responsible 
for storage of content and its experience as personally owned (for a review, see Klein, 2015).
 Although we were unaware at the time, malfunction of the mechanism(s) responsible for feeling 
that one owns one’s mental states is a well-documented clinical phenomenon—e.g., anosagnosia, 
somatoparaphrenia, depersonalization, schizophrenic thought insertion, craniopargus, hallucinations 
(for a review, see Klein, forthcoming). There even are reports (other than that of patient R.B.) in 
which loss of ownership targets “memory.” For example, during the acute phase of depersonalization, 
individuals report that what normally would be taken as memory feels like an alien intrusion (Sierra, 
Baker, Medford, & David, 2005). Talland (1964) presents the case of a patient who accurately could 
describe content retrieved into consciousness, but was unable to experience that content as his own 
(despite its subjectively felt location in his head). Additional cases can be found in Klein (2015).
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 In short, R.B.’s felt loss of ownership can be situated within a well-developed taxonomic and theo-
retical framework (e.g., Klein, 2013, forthcoming; see also Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2013; Ranganath 
& Ritchet, 2012). While such positioning does not guarantee correctness of placement, it does suggest 
that assignment is not easily undermined by purely conceptual analysis.
3. Some additional quotes that illuminate R.B.’s pathology
We believed the quotes in Klein and Nichols nicely captured R.B.’s memory problem. Apparently 
we were wrong. Below I present a few additional quotes that I hope show that R.B’s phenomenol-
ogy consists in the lost ownership of, rather than first-person perspective on, content retrieved into 
consciousness:
My memories [R.B.’s emphasis] do not feel in any way like they’re my memories. They feel like facts I know, like 
that Washington was the first president. I can infer that they’re about me because I know what they’re about. … 
It doesn’t take much (inference). But even then, when I figure out a memory is about me it doesn’t help me take 
ownership. It feels like third party … like it belongs to some else. (Parentheses added for clarification based on 
discussions with R.B.)
Here is a longer quote in “question/answer” format:
S.B.K.: You say you own your memories from after the accident. What do you mean by “owning” your memories?
R.B.:    They feel like things that happened to me. I can see them (in my head). … They feel like part of my 
life … my past … things that happened to me. I was there. I guess that’s what I mean by owning them 
(memory). They’re mine, my past … not something I just know about. … I was there … lived through it.
S.B.K.: And memories from before the accident—you don’t feel like you own them?
R.B.:    Right. I see them play in my head. Like watching a movie. I watch them, they fit (with what I know 
about my past), but I don’t own them. … I don’t feel like I was there (when the events happened). I 
know they must be mine, must have happened to me, but I feel like I’m watching a movie about me 
that I didn’t make (Parentheses added for clarification—based on discussions with R.B.).
In these quotes (as well as many others), R.B. is insistent that he experiences first-person awareness 
of his intentional objects. What he reports missing is any direct, pre-reflective feeling of owning the 
objects that, of ontological necessity, he must have authored.
4. Several additional problems for Roache’s conceptual re-analysis
Roache fails to report an important quote from Klein and Nichols (repeated in other publications; 
e.g., Klein, 2013, 2014b) that, I believe, creates serious problems for her thesis that R.B.’s “memories” 
are more in the nature of “imagination”:
When I did ‘take ownership’ of a memory, it was actually quite isolated. A single memory I might own, yet 
another memory connected to it I would not own. It was a startling experience to have no rhyme or reason to 
which memories I slowly took ownership of, one at a time at random over a period of weeks and months. … 
What happened over the coming months … was interesting. Every once in a while, I would suddenly think about 
something in my past and I would ‘own’ it. That was indeed something ‘I’ had done and experienced. Over time, 
one by one, I would come to ‘own’ different memories. Eventually, after perhaps eight months or so, it seemed 
as if it was all owned … as if once enough individual memories were owned, it was all owned. For example, the 
MIT memory, the one in the lounge … I now own it. It’s clearly part of my life, my past.
 While people can (and often do) confuse memory and imagination, for Roache’s argument to gain 
traction, she would have to allow that an unprecedented number of imaginations are transformed 
in a matter of months into the entire corpus of R.B.’s pre-morbid recollections. Such a finding would 
constitute a unique (and, at present, theoretically inexplicable) occurrence in the annals of neurology. 
In contrast, the interpretation I champion fits comfortably within existing taxonomy of ownership 
pathology and theory about episodic memory (e.g., Klein, 2013, forthcoming; Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 
2013; Moulin, Souchay, & Morris, 2013).
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 Second, R.B. did maintain possessory custody of retrieved content from his post-morbid life. 
Accordingly, he was quite capable of distinguishing content he felt to be memories from content that 
he did not. Finally, as noted in Klein and Nichols, many (i.e., those for which corroboration was possi-
ble) of R.B.’s alleged “imaginations” were validated by third party observers as actual life occurrences.
5. Final thoughts
In summary, Roache makes a number assertions about the “real meaning” of R.B.’s phenomenological 
reports which, in the context of contemporary memory theory, appear questionable. It is well-known 
the reliance on language to convey one’s phenomenology is fraught with difficulty—e.g., the lack of 
terms capable of reflecting the fullness of experience, the influence of social convention on word selec-
tion, and so forth (see Sokolowski, 1999). It is not surprising, therefore, that, from a purely analytic 
perspective, R.B.’s description of his pathology sometimes appears inconsistent. But, when situated 
within the context of current theory and empiricism, his reports strongly suggest that—despite some 
expositional looseness—what he (consistently) says accurately captures his pathology as experienced.
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